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MILKY WHEY, INC. V. DAIRY PARTNERS, LLC:
TRANSACTING BUSINESS UNDER MONTANA’S
LONG-ARM STATUTE TO THE FULL
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT
Victoria Dettman*
I. INTRODUCTION
A Montana court must properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant pursuant to the Constitution’s Due Process Clause
and Montana’s long-arm statute.1 In Milky Whey, Inc. v. Dairy Partners,
LLC,2 the Montana Supreme Court performed a fact-intensive inquiry to
determine that Montana did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant Dairy Partners.
This note discusses how the Court correctly followed precedent in
holding that Montana did not have personal jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent defendant, Dairy Partners, in Milky Whey. Part II explains the constitu-
tional foundations of personal jurisdiction. Part III describes Montana’s
long-arm statute and reviews the history and definition of “transacting busi-
ness” under Montana Supreme Court case law. Next, Part IV provides the
factual and procedural background of Milky Whey. Part V then summarizes
the Court’s reasoning and Chief Justice McGrath’s dissent. Part VI begins
by explaining why the majority was correct in its determination that Dairy
Partners did not transact business in Montana. The Court followed long-
standing precedent, taking the opportunity to aggregate imperative factors
and identify a “substantial interactions” test. The substantial interactions
test can now be used to determine when a nonresident defendant transacted
business in Montana under subsection A of Montana’s long arm statute.
Part VI then discusses why, even if the Court had held that Dairy Partners
transacted business under Montana’s long-arm statute, Montana’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners would not comply with due
process. The analysis finishes with a discussion of how the substantial inter-
actions test confers personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
Constitution.
* J.D., 2017, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. I would like to
thank the editors and staff of the Montana Law Review for their meticulous editing and good advice,
especially Nicholas LeTang and Constance Van Kley. I would also like to thank Professor Anthony
Johnstone for his help with this project and for his guidance of the Montana Law Review. Most of all, I
wish to thank my family and friends for the endless love and encouragement.
1. Simmons v. State, 670 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Mont. 1983).
2. 342 P.3d 13, 20–21 (Mont. 2015).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The outer bounds of personal jurisdiction are constitutionally defined.
The fundamental right of due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution: no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”3 A party’s due process
rights are violated if (1) the party had a constitutionally protected life, lib-
erty, or property interest; (2) the party was deprived of that interest by an
act of the state; and (3) the state did not have a constitutionally sufficient
justification to deprive the party of the interest.4 A nonresident defendant’s
due process rights are violated if she is required to defend a lawsuit in a
state to which she has no substantial connection.5
An extensive line of Supreme Court case law serves as a guide to
states in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
The standard is a fluid one that has necessitated change with the moderniza-
tion of society.
A. The Traditional Standard
Traditionally, personal jurisdiction was simply a question of service of
process and physical presence. The Court’s 1878 decision Pennoyer v. Neff6
solidified a rule limiting a state’s judicial powers to persons served within
its borders, unless the defendant owned property in the state or consented to
jurisdiction. This principle was subsequently expanded in McDonald v.
Mabee,7 where the Court held that service by publication was constitution-
ally insufficient to provide notice to a defendant who had left the state to
reside elsewhere. The Court stated that service must occur in a manner
“most likely to reach the defendant” and provide him or her notice of the
proceedings.8 While purposefully limiting its holding to the facts in Mc-
Donald,9 the Court predicted future expansion of jurisdiction acquisition.10
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4. Geoffrey P. Miller, In Search of the Most Adequate Forum: State Court Personal Jurisdiction,
2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 5 (2014) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–17 (1987); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 465 (1981); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
570–71 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
5. See id. at 5–8 for a discussion of how personal jurisdiction implicates due process considera-
tions.
6. 95 U.S. 714, 722, 733–34 (1878) (“[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory.”).
7. 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 91 (“No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond
service or appearance . . . .”).
2
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That growth occurred, as demonstrated in Milliken v. Meyer,11 when
the Court held that a Wyoming resident personally served outside of the
state was served in a constitutionally sufficient manner to allow for the
exercise of the Wyoming court’s jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that
jurisdictional due process depended on whether service provided the defen-
dant with “actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard.”12
These early jurisdictional standards were applied to physical people,
however, and the Court had to be creative in extending the same principles
to foreign corporations.13 Two legal fictions developed that allowed states
to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corporations.14 First, there was an idea
that a foreign corporation impliedly consented to jurisdiction in a state
where it was doing business.15 The second legal fiction was that a corpora-
tion “doing continuous and systematic business” in a state was physically
present in that state and could therefore be bound by service of process.16
These standards were attenuated, however, and an expanding interstate
economy necessitated true, not fictional, jurisdictional foundations.
B. The Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction
The famous foundation of our modern personal jurisdiction analysis,
focusing not on physical presence but on a defendant’s relationship with the
forum state, lies within the Court’s 1945 decision International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.17 The Court held that exercising personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant complies with due process if the nonresident defen-
dant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state so as to ensure
that the court’s exercise of power over the defendant does not “offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”18 The Court was not
seeking to create a bright-line rule and purposefully did not develop a
mechanical test.19 Instead, the Court instructed that compliance with due
process depends “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws.”20 It clarified that a state
11. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
12. Id.
13. Thomas E. Towe, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Residents and Montana’s New Rule 4B, 24
MONT. L. REV 1, 5–6 (1962).
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 5–6; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
16. Towe, supra note 13, at 6. R
17. 326 U.S. at 316.
18. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
19. Id. at 319.
20. Id.
3
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does not have jurisdiction over “an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”21
The International Shoe Court recognized the quid-pro-quo relationship
that states and foreign corporations have:
to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.
The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with activities within the state, a
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to en-
force them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.22
As long as a foreign corporation has sufficient contacts with the state, ser-
vice upon that corporation provides reasonable assurance that the corpora-
tion received actual notice of the litigation.23
After International Shoe, the Court applied this contacts approach to
personal jurisdiction and expanded the scope of contact needed to satisfy
due process in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.24 In McGee, a
Texas life insurance company insured a California resident.25 The Texas
insurance company sent terms of a reinsurance policy to the insured party in
California, the insured party sent his insurance premiums by mail from Cal-
ifornia to Texas, and later the insured party died in California.26 The Court
held that the life insurance contract created a substantial connection be-
tween the foreign company and California—due process was satisfied.27
California had a “manifest interest in providing effective means of redress
for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.”28 The Court rec-
ognized how both a historical study of personal jurisdiction and a consider-
ation of the transforming national economy supported broadening the scope
of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.29
The Court was unwilling, however, to abolish all limitations on per-
sonal jurisdiction, and less than one year after McGee clarified that it’s
holding did not present a trend towards “the eventual demise of all restric-
tions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”30 In Hanson v. Denckla,31
21. Id. (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 320.
24. 355 U.S. 220, 222–24 (1957).
25. Id. at 221–22.
26. Id. at 223.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 222–23 (“Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may in-
volve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come
a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend him-
self in a State where he engages in economic activity.”).
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
4
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the Court considered Florida’s jurisdiction over a Delaware trust company.
The trust’s settlor executed the trust in Delaware and later moved to Flor-
ida.32 The Delaware company did not have offices in Florida, the trust as-
sets were not held in Florida, and the company did not solicit business in
Florida; therefore, the Delaware company did not transact business in Flor-
ida.33 The Court acknowledged that the trust administration carried on in
Florida was similar to the payment of insurance premiums from California
via the postal service in McGee.34 However, the Court ultimately distin-
guished the facts of McGee, where the insurance company sought to rein-
sure the California resident, from those of Hanson, where the Delaware
company did not solicit any business from the Florida resident.35
The Court clearly focused on which party solicited the business rela-
tionship in distinguishing Hanson from McGee. The Hanson Court ex-
plained, “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State.”36 In McGee, California had a “manifest interest” in protecting
its citizens, but Florida did not have the same interest in Hanson because
the foreign corporation did not solicit the business from a Florida resident.37
The Court acknowledged the flexibility of its contacts test, but drew a line:
“[A]pplication of [the] rule will vary with the quality and nature of the
defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws.”38
The Court has continued to require that a defendant purposefully avail
“itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state”
before personal jurisdiction complies with due process.39 For example, in
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,40 a New York car dealership did not
purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in Oklahoma
even though it could have foreseen that a buyer would drive a car to
Oklahoma. On the other hand, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,41 Hustler
31. Id. at 238.
32. Id. at 238–39.
33. Id. at 251.
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id.
36. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
37. Id. at 252.
38. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 253. While not discussed in this note, it should be acknowledged that the purposeful
availment consideration gets even more complicated in stream-of-commerce cases. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
40. 444 U.S. 286, 287, 295, 299 (1980).
41. 465 U.S. 770, 772, 777–78, 781 (1984).
5
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Magazine purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in
New Hampshire when it distributed its magazine into the state. The Keeton
Court emphasized that, when considering whether minimum contacts exist,
courts should focus on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation.”42 The plaintiff’s relationships with the defendant, forum,
and litigation are notably excluded from the Court’s list. A nonresident de-
fendant avails itself of the privilege of doing business in a state when it
deliberately engages “in significant activities within a State” or has “created
continuing obligations between himself and the residents of the forum.”43
C. Recent Developments
In its 2014 decision Walden v. Fiore,44 the Court emphasized two as-
pects relevant in evaluating whether the defendant’s suit-related conduct
created a substantial connection to the forum state. First, the defendant’s
relationship to the forum state “must arise out of contacts that the defendant
himself creates.”45 The Court reiterated that the plaintiff’s contacts to the
forum state are irrelevant, using Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen as
examples.46 The Court clearly stated its position: “[H]owever significant
the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be
decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are vio-
lated.”47
Second, the Walden Court emphasized that courts should look “to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s con-
tacts with persons who reside there.”48 The Court cited Keeton as an exam-
ple of a situation in which a company deliberately reached out into a forum
state by circulating its magazines.49 A defendant is subject to a state’s per-
sonal jurisdiction when that defendant “purposefully reached out beyond
[its] state and into another by . . . entering a contractual relationship that
envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts in the forum State.”50 It
is important that the plaintiff is not “the only link between the defendant
42. Id. at 775 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). This idea was recently reiter-
ated in Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).
43. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 and
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
44. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121–22.
45. Id. at 1122 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
in original)).
46. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)).
47. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781).
50. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
6
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and the forum.”51 Therefore, a contract alone is inadequate to establish suf-
ficient minimum contacts.52 To comply with due process, a state can only
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant “based on his
own affiliation with the State, not based on the random, fortuitous, or atten-
uated contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the
State.”53
Consideration of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state is a
threshold jurisdictional inquiry. After a court establishes that the “defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state, [those]
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and
substantial justice.’”54 These factors, specifically enumerated in World-
Wide Volkswagen and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,55 include: “the bur-
den on the defendant; the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;
the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; the inter-
state judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fun-
damental substantive social policies.”56 After considering these factors, a
court may determine that asserting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant does not comport with fair play and substantial justice and there-
fore violates due process, even if the defendant has sufficient contacts with
the forum state.57
The Court’s due process standard for state exercise of personal juris-
diction has evolved as our nation has developed, and, if history is any indi-
cation, we can likely expect to see change in the future as well.
III. BACKGROUND OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN MONTANA
Each state grants its courts personal jurisdiction power over nonresi-
dent defendants via a long-arm statute.58 Some states’ long-arm statutes
simply confer personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Consti-
tution.59 Other states, like Montana, define the scope of personal jurisdic-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1122–23 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478).
53. Id. at 1123 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (internal quotations omitted).
54. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
55. 471 U.S. 462.
56. Id. at 476–77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292) (internal quotations omitted).
57. Id. at 477–78.
58. Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of
Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496 (2004).
59. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2016) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdic-
tion on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”).
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tion by expressly stating what type of contact a nonresident defendant must
have with the state before its courts may exercise personal jurisdiction.60
Montana has developed a two-prong test that must be satisfied for a
nonresident defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction.61 First, the non-
resident defendant’s conduct must fall within Montana’s long-arm statute.62
Second, the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant must satisfy due process by comporting “with traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”63 Analysis of the second prong is only
necessary if the first is satisfied.64
A. Montana’s Long-Arm Statute
1. History of Montana’s Long-Arm Statute
On January 1, 1962, the modern Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
became effective.65 The rules were generally fashioned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and were, in part, “designed to aid the exercise of
jurisdiction in cases having substantial contacts with Montana.”66 Mon-
tana’s long-arm statute was enacted among these new rules as Montana
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b).67 This new rule was needed because the old
code provisions too narrowly limited personal jurisdiction.68
Montana followed the national trend away from personal jurisdiction
based on physical service within the state and towards personal jurisdiction
based on service that provided the defendant with sufficient notice of the
pending litigation.69 Montana’s Rule 4(b) was modeled after the First Ten-
tative Draft of the Uniform Extra-Territorial Process Act and similar stat-
utes from states like Illinois, Texas, and Wisconsin.70 The Commission
Note made clear Montana’s intent to expand its scope of personal jurisdic-
tion:
This rule expands the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in
cases having substantial contacts with Montana. It is in accord with a trend
that began more than thirty years ago with the nonresident motorist acts. The
constitutional basis for such expanded jurisdiction is afforded by such deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States as International Shoe and
60. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1) (2015).
61. Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1376.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. David R. Mason, The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 MONT. L. REV 1, 3 (1961).
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 12.
8
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McGee. In these decisions the Court departed materially from the rigid rule of
Pennoyer, although, as was pointed out in Hanson, the rule of Pennoyer has
not wholly disappeared. Under the new and flexible standard of due process a
state may exercise personal jurisdiction whenever the relation between it and
the particular litigation sued upon makes it reasonable for the state to try the
particular case. In such an inquiry importance attaches to what the defendant
has caused to be done in the forum state.71
While clearly stating an intent to expand Montana’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents who have substantial contacts with Montana,
the Commission Notes do not clarify whether Rule 4(b) was meant to ex-
tend personal jurisdiction as far as due process allows or whether Supreme
Court precedent was simply a guideline in forming a scope of jurisdiction
unique to Montana.
2. General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction under Montana’s
Long-arm Statute
Montana’s long-arm statute provides:
Subject to jurisdiction. All persons found within the state of Montana are
subject to the jurisdiction of Montana courts. Additionally, any person is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of Montana courts as to any claim for relief arising
from the doing personally, or through an employee or agent, of any of the
following acts:
(A) the transaction of any business within Montana;
(B) the commission of any act resulting in accrual within Montana of a tort
action;
(C) the ownership, use, or possession of any property, or of any interest
therein, situated within Montana;
(D) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within Montana
at the time of contracting;
(E) entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be
furnished in Montana by such person;
(F) acting as a director, manager, trustee, or other officer of a corporation
organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within,
Montana; or
(G) acting as personal representative of any estate within Montana.72
This rule confers on courts the power to exercise both general and specific
jurisdiction. General jurisdiction is continuous personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident arising from any cause of action, regardless of its origin, be-
cause of the nonresident’s significant connection to the state.73 A nonresi-
dent defendant must be “found within the state of Montana” to be subject to
general personal jurisdiction under Montana’s long-arm statute.74 To be
71. Commission Note to Proposed Rule, MONT. R. CIV. P. 4 (West) (internal citations omitted).
72. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1).
73. Tackett v. Duncan, 334 P.3d 920, 925 (Mont. 2014).
74. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1).
9
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“found within” Montana, foreign corporations’ “affiliations with the State
[must be] so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at
home in” Montana.”75 A corporate defendant is generally only “at home”
where it is incorporated and where its principal place of business is lo-
cated.76
Alternatively, a nonresident defendant may be subject to specific per-
sonal jurisdiction if the specific claim arises out of one of the seven enu-
merated acts.77 This note focuses on subsection A: specific jurisdiction
based on nonresident defendants’ transaction of business within Montana.
This rule has good intentions—it gives Montana courts jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants when a Montana plaintiff’s claim arises from the
defendant’s business transaction within Montana. However, the definition
of “transacting business within Montana” is fact-intensive and therefore the
analysis varies from case-to-case.
B. The History of “Transacting Business” in Montana
When Montana’s long-arm statute was first enacted, attorney Thomas
E. Towe made two predictions. First, he predicted that the definition of “the
transaction of any business within” Montana was “certain to cause a great
deal of litigation.”78 Second, he predicted that giving the provision too wide
of a definition would result in rendering other subsections of Montana’s
long-arm statute meaningless.79
Towe noted that Montana’s “transacting business” subsection was the
same as the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act’s provision
75. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
76. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16–405, ___ U.S. ___, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3395, at *16–17 (May
30, 2017). A corporate defendant can also be “at home” in an “exceptional case” where the “defendant’s
operations in another forum may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at
home in that State.” Id. at *17 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19). An
example of an “exceptional case” is that of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
447–48, where “war had forced the defendant corporation’s owner to temporarily relocate the enterprise
from the Philippines to Ohio,” which “then became the center of the corporation’s wartime activities.”
BNSF at *17.
In BNSF the Court held BNSF was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Montana, as
BNSF is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Texas, and the Court
did not find the case to be an exceptional one rendering the railroad company at home in Montana. Id. at
*7, 18. The Court highlighted the difference between general and specific personal jurisdiction, stating,
“the business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to subject the railroad to specific personal jurisdiction
in that State on claims related to the business it does in Montana. But in-state business . . . does not
suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any activity
occurring in Montana.” Id. at *18.
77. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1)(A)–(G).
78. Towe, supra note 13, at 26. R
79. Id. at 27–28.
10
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and Illinois’s long-arm statute.80 The Act provided, “A court may exercise
jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of
action] [claim for relief] arising from the person’s transacting any business
in this state.”81 The Act’s provision was derived from Illinois’s statute and
was intended to “be given the same expansive interpretation that was in-
tended by the draftsmen of the Illinois Act and that has been given by
courts of that state.”82 Illinois courts interpreted the statute as extending
personal jurisdiction to the full constitutional limit permitted by due pro-
cess.83 Perhaps then, because Montana’s long-arm statute was fashioned af-
ter Illinois’s statute, it too was to be interpreted as expanding personal juris-
diction to the full constitutional limit.
However, Towe pointed out a main difference between Illinois’s and
Montana’s long-arm statutes.84 He observed that, despite having identical
subsection A’s, Montana’s long-arm statute contained more provisions than
Illinois’ long-arm statute.85 Illinois’s statute had nothing similar to Mon-
tana’s subsections E or F.86 Subsection E of Montana’s statute provides
specific jurisdiction over a defendant based on “entering into a contract for
services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished” in Montana.87
Towe observed that “these words would appear to include any and all iso-
lated business transactions,” and therefore if Montana defined transacting
business as broadly as Illinois, subsection E would be meaningless.88 Towe
pointed out that adopting California’s approach of permitting jurisdiction to
the full constitutional limit would have a similar result.89
Therefore, Towe suggested Montana courts may choose to define
“transacting business” not to the full constitutional limit like Illinois.90 In-
stead, Towe proposed Montana might define transacting business the same
way it defined “doing business.”91 At that time, the Montana Supreme
Court defined “doing business” as “more than a single sale, more than mere
solicitation”—it was “more or less a continuing course of business within
the state,” with or without a resident business agent.92
80. Id. at 26.
81. UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT’L PROC. ACT § 1.03(a)(1) (1962) (withdrawn 1977).
82. Comment to UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT’L PROC. ACT § 1.03(a)(1) (citations omitted).
83. Towe, supra note 13, at 27–28. R
84. Id. at 28.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1)(E).
88. Towe, supra note 13, at 28. R
89. Id. at 26–27.
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 27.
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In fulfillment of Towe’s first prediction,93 the Montana Supreme Court
must continually decide cases defining “transacting business” under subsec-
tion A. In those decisions, the Court analyzes the business contacts between
the parties, looking for various factors.94 In determining whether a company
transacted business in Montana, the Court considers the nonresident’s con-
tacts with the state.95
The Court has held that the simple act of entering into a contract with a
Montana resident does not subject a nonresident to personal jurisdiction in
Montana.96 In Cimmaron Corp. v. Smith,97 the Court reasoned that the non-
resident defendant did not transact business within Montana when its sole
contacts with Montana were the agreements with the plaintiff, the agree-
ment was to be performed in another state, and the plaintiff’s complaint did
not allege any wrongful actions of the defendant that occurred in Mon-
tana.98
On the other hand, the Court has held that a nonresident defendant
transacts business in Montana if the defendant has contracts with multiple
Montana businesses. For example, in Grizzly Security Armored Express,
Inc. v. Armored Group, LLC,99 the nonresident defendant entered into sev-
eral contracts with other Montana businesses and therefore transacted busi-
ness in Montana.100 Also, in Nelson v. San Joaquin Helicopters,101 the non-
resident defendant transacted business in Montana because it had relation-
ships with the plaintiff and another company in Montana.102
In determining whether a nonresident defendant transacted business in
Montana, the Court has often considered which party initiated the business
transaction. A nonresident company transacts business in Montana if it is
the party that initiates the business transaction because, in that situation, the
nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in Montana and invoked the protection of Montana’s laws.103 For
example, in Spectrum Pool Products, Inc. v. MW Golden, Inc.,104 the non-
93. Id. at 26.
94. See, e.g., Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20, Cimmaron Corp. v. Smith, 67 P.3d 258, 261 (Mont.
2003); Spectrum Pool Prods., Inc. v. MW Golden, Inc., 968 P.2d 728, 731 (Mont. 1998); Edsall Constr.
Co. v. Robinson, 804 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Mont. 1991); Prentice Lumber Co. v. Spahn, 474 P.2d 141, 144
(Mont. 1970).
95. B.T. Metal Works v. United Die & Mfg. Co., 100 P.3d 127, 133 (Mont. 2004).
96. Edsall, 804 P.2d at 1042; Cimmaron, 67 P.3d at 261.
97. 67 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2003).
98. Id. at 261.
99. 255 P.3d 143 (Mont. 2011).
100. Id. at 149.
101. 742 P.2d 447 (Mont. 1987).
102. Id. at 450.
103. Prentice Lumber, 474 P.2d at 144.
104. 968 P.2d 728, 731 (Mont. 1998).
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resident defendant transacted business in Montana because it initiated con-
tact with the Montana company. However, if a Montana company initiates
contact with a nonresident business, the nonresident does not transact busi-
ness in Montana based on the contract alone.105
As the above examples show, the definition of transacting business is
fact-intensive and therefore it can be difficult to determine whether a spe-
cific defendant transacted business in Montana. The Montana Supreme
Court’s decision in Milky Whey clarified the definition of transacting busi-
ness, setting the scope of the definition to the full extent permitted by the
due process clause.
IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF Milky Whey
Milky Whey started as a dispute over a simple business transaction
gone badly, but the case unexpectedly posed a complicated jurisdictional
question. Milky Whey is a dairy broker that purchases dairy commodities
from suppliers and subsequently sells the products to food manufactures.106
It is a registered Montana corporation headquartered in Missoula, Mon-
tana.107 Dairy Partners is a dairy supply company located in Minnesota.108
In 2013, Dairy Partners was one of Milky Whey’s suppliers.109
Prior to the commencement of the action, Dairy Partners fulfilled nine
orders, valued at over $181,000, for Milky Whey between 2010 and
2013.110 To complete these transactions, the parties communicated via tele-
phone, fax, and email, and—on occasion—Dairy Partners initiated the
purchase orders.111 Dairy Partners neither purchased nor sold products in
Montana and did not have a physical presence inside Montana.112 Other
than its communications with Milky Whey, nothing connected Dairy Part-
ners to Montana.113
The lawsuit was the result of a transaction Milky Whey initiated with
Dairy Partners on January 23, 2013.114 Milky Whey agreed to purchase
10,000 pounds of Swiss Trim from Dairy Partners for $12,500.115 Milky
Whey pre-paid the purchase price, wiring money from Missoula to Dairy
105. Edsall, 804 P.2d at 1042–43.
106. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 14.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 14–15.
111. Id. at 14–15, 18.
112. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 17.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id.
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Partners in Minnesota.116 Milky Whey did not express to Dairy Partners
whether it intended to bring the Swiss Trim into Montana.117 Dairy Partners
shipped the Swiss Trim to its warehouse in Salt Lake City and Milky Whey
picked it up about five weeks later, only to find that nearly half of it had
molded and was therefore unusable.118 The parties communicated via e-
mail and attempted to resolve the issue, but Dairy Partners refused to reim-
burse Milky Whey for the damaged product.119
Milky Whey filed its complaint against Dairy Partners on September
26, 2013, alleging four causes of action.120 Dairy Partners subsequently
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.121 The district
court granted Dairy Partners’ motion and dismissed the action, holding that
Montana’s long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.122 Milky Whey appealed the district court’s decision to the Montana
Supreme Court,123 contending that Dairy Partners transacted business and
was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction under subsection A of Mon-
tana’s long-arm statute.124
V. THE COURT’S DECISION AND CHIEF JUSTICE MCGRATH’S DISSENT
A. The Majority’s Decision and Reasoning
The Court employed its two-prong personal jurisdiction test and af-
firmed the district court’s determination that Montana lacked personal juris-
diction over Dairy Partners.125 The Court held that Dairy Partners did not
transact business within Montana and that therefore Montana’s long-arm
statute did not reach Dairy Partners.126
To begin its analysis, the Court first considered whether Montana’s
long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction on Dairy Partners.127 The Court
quickly disposed of the idea that general personal jurisdiction could exist,
finding that Dairy Partners had no substantial or systematic contacts with
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 15; Appellant the Milky Whey, Inc.’s Opening Brief, The Milky Whey,
Inc. v. Dairy Partners, LLC, 2014 WL 1318228 at *2 (Mont. 2014) (No. DA–14–0013).
119. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 15.
120. Id. Milky Whey alleged “breach of contract, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and breach
of an obligation to pay.” Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 17. The Court also considered and rejected Milky Whey’s contention that Dairy Partners
was subject to personal jurisdiction under subsection B of Montana’s long-arm statute. Id.
125. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 17, 21.
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id. at 17.
14
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Montana, and moved on to its analysis of whether specific personal juris-
diction existed because Dairy Partners transacted business within Montana
under Rule 4(b)(1)(A).128 The Court considered various factors, including:
the company’s local negotiations, “the solicitation of business within the
state, prior litigations in the forum, the presence of agents in the state, and
the existence of ongoing contractual relationships with residents of the fo-
rum state.”129 The Court applied these factors and determined that Dairy
Partners did not transact business within Montana.130
The Court focused on four specific facts to support its conclusion that
Dairy Partners did not transact business in Montana. First, it was Milky
Whey who initiated the transaction with Dairy Partners.131 Second, Dairy
Partners did not send representatives to or negotiate contracts in Mon-
tana.132 Third, Dairy Partners did not have contracts or business relation-
ships with any other Montana businesses.133 Fourth, no part of the contract
occurred in Montana; the product was delivered to Utah pursuant to the
parties’ agreement.134
The Court reasoned that a company transacts business in Montana
“where substantial interactions occur within Montana.”135 The Court stated
that substantial interactions include “entering into contracts with multiple
Montana businesses or negotiating contracts between businesses.”136 How-
ever, the simple act of a nonresident entering into a contract with a Montana
resident is not a substantial interaction. The Court emphasized this by com-
paring Dairy Partners’ interactions with Montana businesses to the interac-
tions of the nonresident defendant in Cimmaron, where Montana did not
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the contract at issue
was for services to be performed exclusively in another state.137 The Court
made its position very clear that agreeing to contracts with multiple busi-
nesses can confer personal jurisdiction, but “even extensive interstate com-
munications . . . do not give rise to jurisdiction where the contract is to be
performed in another state.”138
The Court distinguished Milky Whey and Dairy Partners’ relationship
from the business relationships of parties in earlier cases where the Court
128. Id. at 17–18.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 17–18.
131. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20.
132. Id. at 19.
133. Id. at 20.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 19.
136. Id. (citing Grizzly, 255 P.3d at 148; Nelson, 742 P.2d at 448).
137. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 19; Cimmaron, 67 P.3d at 260–61.
138. Id. (citing Cimmaron, 67 P.3d at 260–61; Bird v. Hiller, 892 P.2d 931, 934 (Mont. 1995);
Edsall, 804 P.2d at 1042).
15
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held that the nonresident defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction.139
The Court explained that in Grizzly, the nonresident defendant entered into
multiple contracts, interacted with other businesses in Montana, and adver-
tised in Montana.140 In Nelson v. San Joaquin Helicopters,141 the nonresi-
dent company purposefully interjected itself into Montana by contracting
with another business in Montana and negotiating a specific contract with
the plaintiff.142 In Spectrum Pool Products, the nonresident defendant initi-
ated the business relationship, negotiated with the Montana company re-
garding multiple aspects of the contract, and requested that services be per-
formed on the product in Montana.143 In B.T. Metal Works v. United Die
and Manufacturing Co.,144 the nonresident defendant made a product for a
Montana business and sent the product into Montana more than 20 times.145
The defendants in those cases had more interaction with Montana than
Dairy Partners.146 The Court made it clear that Dairy Partners was not
“transacting with a Montana business” based simply on the fact that it knew
Milky Whey was a Montana business.147
The Court concluded that subsection A of Montana’s long-arm statute
did not reach Dairy Partners.148 Because it determined part one of the test
was not satisfied, the Court did not reach part two, whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction was within the limits of due process.149
B. Chief Justice McGrath’s Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice McGrath, joined by Justice Wheat, disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion that Dairy Partners was not subject to personal juris-
diction under subsection A of Montana’s long-arm statute.150 The dissent
emphasized Milky Whey and Dairy Partners’ past transactions and charac-
terized the current agreement as more than a “mere act of entering into a
contract with a forum resident.”151 Instead, Chief Justice McGrath charac-
terized Dairy Partners’ actions as “purposeful acts through which [it] did
repeated business with a Montana company.”152 He emphasized that the
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. (citing Grizzly, 255 P.3d at 148).
141. 742 P.2d 447.
142. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20 (citing Nelson, 742 P.2d at 450).
143. Id. (citing Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 730–31).
144. 100 P.3d 127 (Mont. 2004).
145. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20 (citing B.T. Metal Works, 100 P.3d at 132–33).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 21.
149. Id.
150. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 21 (McGrath, C.J., with Wheat, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (quoting Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1386).
152. Id.
16
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payment to Dairy Partners originated in Montana and that the refund Dairy
Partners allegedly initially promised Milky Whey would have accrued in
Montana.153
Chief Justice McGrath highlighted Montana’s interest in adjudicating
the issue.154 Additionally, Chief Justice McGrath enumerated the ways in
which Milky Whey contributes to Montana’s economy by generating in-
come, paying taxes, employing Montana residents, and utilizing Montana
infrastructure.155 Chief Justice McGrath would have held that Milky Whey
and Dairy Partners’ continuous transactions established that Dairy Partners
was transacting business in Montana pursuant to the standard from Griz-
zly.156 Because Chief Justice McGrath would have found that Montana’s
long-arm statute conferred personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners under
step one of the analysis, he briefly addressed step two and concluded that
due process was satisfied.157
VI. ANALYSIS
In Milky Whey, the majority correctly followed precedent in holding
that nonresident defendant Dairy Partners did not transact business in Mon-
tana and therefore was not subject to personal jurisdiction. The Milky Whey
Court aggregated factors from precedent and named a “substantial interac-
tions” test to determine if a nonresident defendant transacted business in
Montana. Even if the Court had found that Dairy Partners transacted busi-
ness under Montana’s long-arm statute, Montana’s exercise of personal ju-
risdiction would have still failed because it would not comply with due
process. The substantial interactions test confers jurisdiction under subsec-
tion A of Montana’s long-arm statute to the full extent permitted by the Due
Process Clause.
A. The Majority’s Correct Application of Precedent
The majority correctly applied precedent in holding that Dairy Partners
did not transact business within Montana solely based on its contract with
Milky Whey. Case law establishes that a nonresident defendant must do
more than enter into a contract with a Montana resident to transact business
153. Id.
154. Id. Specifically, Chief Justice McGrath pointed out that Montana “provided the setting which
allowed Dairy [Partners] to engage in the various transactions with Milky Whey over a span of years.”
Id.
155. Id.
156. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 21 (McGrath C.J., with Wheat, J., dissenting) (citing Grizzly, 255 P.3d
at 148).
157. Id. at 21–22.
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within Montana.158 Personal jurisdiction is particularly inappropriate when
it is based on an agreement, no part of which will be performed in Mon-
tana.159 The Court appropriately relied on and distinguished its previous
decisions in concluding that Dairy Partners was not subject to personal ju-
risdiction based solely on the fact that it entered into a contract with Milky
Whey, especially when that contract was to be performed outside of Mon-
tana.
A nonresident defendant transacts business within Montana when it
has business contracts with more than one Montana business. In both Griz-
zly and Nelson, the nonresident defendant had contracts with businesses in
Montana other than the plaintiff.160 These multiple business relationships
led to the Court’s conclusions that the defendants transacted business within
Montana and were subject to personal jurisdiction.161 Dairy Partners did not
have contracts with other Montana businesses, and therefore the Court cor-
rectly determined that Dairy Partners did not transact business in Montana
in the way the nonresident defendants in Grizzly and Nelson did.
A nonresident defendant who ships its product into Montana transacts
business in the state and is consequently subject to personal jurisdiction. In
B.T. Metal Works, the nonresident defendant sent its product into Montana
more than 20 times and therefore transacted business in Montana.162 The
Court properly distinguished Dairy Partners’ relationship with Montana
from that of the defendant in B.T. Metal Works because, unlike the nonresi-
dent defendant in B.T. Metal Works, Dairy Partners did not ship its product
into Montana.163 Therefore, the Court properly determined that Dairy Part-
ners did not transact business within Montana in the same way that the
defendant in B.T. Metal Works did.
The majority and the dissent both rely on Spectrum Pool Products to
support their positions.164 However, Spectrum Pool Products is not espe-
cially helpful to either side because it relied heavily on subsection E of
Montana’s long-arm statute, “entering into a contract for services to be ren-
dered or for materials to be furnished in Montana,” to confer personal juris-
diction on the nonresident defendant.165 Spectrum Pool Products only
briefly addressed subsection A.166 In its analysis of subsection A, Spectrum
Pool Products clarified that an important fact in determining whether the
158. Cimmaron, 67 P.3d at 260–61; Edsall, 804 P.2d at 1042; Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1380.
159. Cimmaron, 67 P.3d at 260–61.
160. Grizzly, 255 P.3d at 148; Nelson, 742 P.2d at 450.
161. Grizzly, 255 P.3d at 149; Nelson, 742 P.2d at 450.
162. 100 P.3d at 132–33.
163. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20 (majority opinion).
164. Id.; id. at 21 (McGrath, C.J., with Wheat, J., dissenting).
165. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1)(E) (2015); 968 P.2d at 730–31.
166. 968 P.2d at 730–31.
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol78/iss2/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-2\MON203.txt unknown Seq: 19  8-SEP-17 12:20
2017 MILKY WHEY, INC. V. DAIRY PARTNERS, LLC 357
nonresident defendant transacted business in Montana was whether the non-
resident defendant initiated contact with the Montana plaintiff.167 The ma-
jority properly differentiated the facts of Spectrum Pool Products, where
the nonresident defendant was the party to initiate the transaction, with
those in Milky Whey, where the Montana plaintiff was the party to initiate
contact with the nonresident defendant, Dairy Partners.168 On the other
hand, the dissent simply stated, “As in Spectrum Pool [Products], Dairy
[Partners] purposely interjected itself into Montana through its several deal-
ings with Milky Whey.”169 However, a close reading of Spectrum Pool
Products verifies that the Court relied more on subsection E of Montana’s
long-arm statute than it did on subsection A in determining that the nonresi-
dent defendant interjected itself into Montana.170 The majority correctly
distinguished Spectrum Pool Products, while the dissent’s reliance on Spec-
trum Pool Products to support personal jurisdiction under subsection A was
misplaced.
B. The Substantial Interactions Test
In Milky Whey, the majority reasoned that the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction under subsection A is proper where “substantial interactions oc-
cur within Montana.”171 The phrase “substantial interactions” is not used in
any of the cases the Court cites in its analysis of the definition of transact-
ing business within Montana. The majority in Milky Whey coined this novel
phrase and aggregated important factors from precedent to clarify when a
nonresident defendant transacts business in Montana under subsection A of
Montana’s long-arm statute. Substantial interactions within Montana in-
clude: entering into contracts with more than one Montana business, negoti-
ating contracts between multiple Montana businesses, agreeing to ship and/
or shipping product into Montana, and initiating contact with a Montana
resident.172 Montana courts should also consider factors such as prior litiga-
tions in Montana and whether the defendant has agents in Montana.173
C. State and Federal Due Process Tests
Montana would not have personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners
even if the Court determined that Dairy Partners transacted business in
Montana pursuant to subsection A of Montana’s long-arm statute because
167. Id. at 731.
168. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20.
169. Id. at 21 (McGrath, C.J., with Wheat, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
170. Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 730–31.
171. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 19 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at 19–20.
173. Id. at 17–18.
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the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners would violate due
process. The majority in Milky Whey did not reach the question of whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners satisfied due pro-
cess by comporting with traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice because it found that the first prong of the personal jurisdiction test was
not satisfied.174 However, the dissent did address the question and took the
position that “subjecting Dairy [Partners] to jurisdiction in Montana courts
on this claim would comport with notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice, consistent with due process.”175 That said, the dissent’s conclusion is
inconsistent with both Montana’s due process analysis and the Supreme
Court’s due process framework set forth in Walden v. Fiore.176
1. Montana’s Due Process Analysis
Montana has adopted a three-part test developed by the Ninth Circuit
to determine whether state exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant comports with due process:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some trans-
action with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby invoking its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s
forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.177
A plaintiff does not have to prove that all three elements of the test are
satisfied.178 Once the plaintiff shows element one, purposeful availment,
personal jurisdiction over the defendant is presumed reasonable.179 After a
plaintiff establishes the presumed reasonableness, a defendant can only
overcome the presumption “by presenting a compelling case that jurisdic-
tion would be unreasonable.”180
First, a nonresident defendant must purposefully avail itself of the
privilege of doing business in Montana, thereby invoking the laws of Mon-
tana. As to this first factor, “[i]t is well-settled that a nonresident defen-
dant’s mere act of entering into a contract with a forum resident does not
provide the necessary jurisdictional contact between the defendant and the
forum state.”181 In Simmons v. State,182 the Montana Supreme Court ac-
174. Id. at 21.
175. Id. (McGrath, C.J., with Wheat, J., dissenting).
176. 134 S. Ct. at 1121–23.
177. Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 731 (citing Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1378).
178. B.T. Metal Works, 100 P.3d at 134.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1380.
20
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knowledged nonresident defendants will often contract with residents of the
forum state for goods and services that are to be provided outside of the
forum state. Those nonresident defendants do “not maintain businesses,
property or agents in the forum state, and they [do] not actively transact
commercial or industrial activity therein.”183 Because of the way these non-
resident defendants do business, personal jurisdiction over such defendants
is inappropriate.184 When “critical performance” of the business contract
occurs outside of the forum state, personal jurisdiction is inappropriate,
even if the nonresident defendant was aware that its product could eventu-
ally end up in the forum state.185 Similarly, because “interstate communica-
tion is an almost inevitable accompaniment to doing business in the modern
world,” telephone and mail communications between parties “cannot by
[themselves] be considered a contact for justifying the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.”186
The considerations under part one of Montana’s due process test
closely resemble Montana’s substantial interactions test, and, as already dis-
cussed, Dairy Partners did not transact business in Montana solely based on
its contract with Montana plaintiff Milky Whey.187 Thus, necessarily, under
Simmons, Dairy Partners did nothing to purposely avail itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within Montana.
Second, the claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s fo-
rum-related activities.188 This factor is important to the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction, as the focus is on the one claim, not the defendant’s
general relationship with the forum state. The Court rarely considers this
factor separately.189 This is likely due to the presumption of reasonableness
that arises upon the showing of purposeful availment.190 However, it re-
mains one of the factors and deserves its due consideration. In Milky Whey,
the only forum-related activity relevant to this factor is the Swiss Trim busi-
ness transaction, as Milky Whey’s claim arose out of only that transac-
tion.191 The other business dealings between the parties are irrelevant, as
Milky Whey’s claim did not arise out of those other dealings. Dairy Part-
ners did not engage in forum-related activities when it engaged in the Swiss
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
187. See supra Part VI, Section A.
188. Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 731 (citing Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1378).
189. See, e.g., id.; Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1379–80; B.T. Metal Works, 100 P.3d at 134.
190. B.T. Metal Works, 100 P.3d at 134.
191. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 15.
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Trim business transaction, as it did not initiate the business transaction and
had no other interactions with Montana related to that sale.192
In analyzing the third part of the test, whether the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is reasonable, Montana courts consider similar factors to those reasona-
bleness factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volk-
swagen193 and Burger King.194 Montana’s reasonableness factors are:
(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into Montana;
(2) the burden on the defendant of defending in Montana;
(3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state;
(4) Montana’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(5) the most efficient resolution of the controversy;
(6) the importance of Montana to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and
effective relief; and
(7) the existence of an alternative forum.195
In the time since the compilation of the reasonableness inquiry, the
importance of each separate factor has changed. For example, the burden of
defending a lawsuit in a foreign state has decreased throughout the years.196
A nonresident defendant can quite easily and adequately prepare for and
defend a suit in a foreign state.197 Montana courts still have an interest in
allowing Montana plaintiffs to bring claims for tortious acts, regardless of
where the act occurred.198 However, Montana’s interests should not be
weighted too heavily, because a state almost always has a legitimate interest
in safeguarding legal rights.199 In the same light, it can also usually be said
that Montana is a convenient forum that will likely provide effective relief
for a plaintiff who is located in Montana.200 However, the plaintiff’s inter-
est in Montana as a forum state is diminished if the plaintiff can bring its
suit in an alternative forum.201 The forum that will provide the most effi-
cient resolution of the controversy will vary case-by-case, but the most effi-
cient forum is often where the actual acts or events occurred because most
of the witnesses will be in that location.202
192. Id.
193. 444 U.S. at 292.
194. 471 U.S. at 476–77.
195. Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 731 (citing Nelson, 742 P.2d at 450). Most of these factors
were originally articulated by the Montana Supreme Court in Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1383–85. Simmons
marked the first time the Montana Supreme Court considered the effect of World-Wide Volkswagen on
the state’s due process constitutional analysis. Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1378.
196. Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1383.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1383.
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In Milky Whey, the factors do not necessarily weigh for or against the
reasonableness of Montana’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dairy
Partners. If Dairy Partners was required to defend a lawsuit in Montana, it
would be burdened because it has absolutely no connection to Montana
other than its contractual relationship with Milky Whey. On the other hand,
Chief Justice McGrath makes a good argument that Montana has a high
interest in adjudicating the dispute because of what Milky Whey, a local
business, adds to Montana’s economy in revenue and jobs.203 Also, Milky
Whey, as the plaintiff, does have an interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, and having to bring this lawsuit elsewhere would be less
efficient for the company. In a case such as this one, where the plaintiff
lives in one state, the defendant lives in another, and the claim accrued in
yet another, there is unfortunately no forum that will be efficient for every
party. Additionally, Utah, where the moldy product was discovered,204 may
be an efficient forum because witnesses to the transaction may reside there.
Even if the Court had held that Dairy Partners had enough contact with
Montana to transact business in the state, exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Dairy Partners based on the Swiss Trim transaction would not have
comported with the due process standard of fair play and substantial justice.
2. The Supreme Court’s Contacts Requirement
The Supreme Court’s recent due process framework in Walden also
does not support personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners. The Walden
Court instructed state courts to consider two aspects in determining whether
the defendant’s suit-related conduct created a substantial connection to the
forum state. First, “[t]he relationship must arise out of contacts that the
defendant himself creates with the forum State.”205 This first requirement
fails because Milky Whey was the party who initiated the botched Swiss
Trim transaction with Dairy Partners;206 therefore, the defendant did not
create his own contacts with Montana for purposes of this claim.
Second, courts should look “to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there,”
because “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
forum.”207 This aspect also fails because the only affiliation that Dairy Part-
ners had with Montana was its contractual relationship with Milky Whey.
Dairy Partners did not have contractual relationships with other Montana
203. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 21–22 (McGrath, C.J., with Wheat, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 15 (majority opinion).
205. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis in original).
206. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 18–19.
207. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
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residents and did not ship its product to Montana.208 Under Walden, Mon-
tana could not have subjected Dairy Partners to the power of its courts
based exclusively on Dairy Partners’ connection to the resident plaintiff.
Because Walden’s standards could not be satisfied, Montana’s exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners based on the Swiss Trim
business transaction would violate due process.
Even if Dairy Partners did have sufficient contacts with Montana, ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction over Dairy Partners based on the Swiss Trim
business transaction with Milky Whey may not have comported with the
federal standard of “fair play and substantial justice” articulated in World-
Wide Volkswagen.209 As discussed in the immediately preceding section,
Montana adopted many of the Supreme Court’s factors in part three of its
due process analysis, and the same inconclusive result reached there can be
found under the federal standard.210
D. The Substantial Interactions Test and the Full Constitutional Limit
of Personal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court’s “substantial connection[s]” threshold needed for
due process presents the same standard as Montana’s “substantial interac-
tions” needed for the transaction of business under Montana’s long-arm
statute.211 In Walden the Supreme Court stated that “the defendant’s suit-
related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum
State.”212 Similarly, in Milky Whey the Montana Supreme Court stated that
a party transacts business under subsection A of Montana’s long-arm statute
when “substantial interactions occur within Montana.”213 The terms “sub-
stantial connection” and “substantial interaction” used by the respective
high courts are unquestionably similar, and as applied in practice the stan-
dards for due process and transacting business are the same.
Both the federal due process analysis and Montana’s substantial inter-
actions test require more than a single contract between a nonresident de-
fendant and a resident of the forum state. The Supreme Court has held that a
contract alone is insufficient to establish minimum contacts sufficient for
due process;214 the plaintiff cannot be the only connection between the de-
fendant and the forum state.215 A nonresident defendant also cannot be said
208. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 19–20.
209. 444 U.S. at 292; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
210. See supra Part VI, Section C(1).
211. Compare Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121–22, with Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 19.
212. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121–22.
213. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 19.
214. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478.
215. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122–23.
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to have transacted business under Montana’s long-arm statute based on a
contract alone; pursuant to Cimmaron, Edsall, and Simmons, a nonresident
defendant must do more than enter into a contract with a Montana resident
to transact business within Montana.216
Which party solicited the business relationship is an imperative factor
in both the Supreme Court’s due process analysis and the Montana Supreme
Court’s substantial interactions test. In McGee, the Supreme Court held that
California had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident company because
the company solicited business from a California resident,217 whereas the
Court held that Florida did not have personal jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent company in Hanson when the company did not solicit business from
the Florida resident.218 When enacting Montana’s long-arm statute, the
drafters noted that a proper consideration of whether the defendant’s activi-
ties fall under the statute “attaches to what the defendant has caused to be
done in the forum state.”219 In Spectrum Pool Products, the Montana Su-
preme Court clarified that a nonresident defendant may have transacted
business in Montana by initiating the business relationship with the Mon-
tana resident.220
Which party solicited the business transaction is important because if
the nonresident defendant initiated the transaction, the defendant purpose-
fully availed “itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the fo-
rum State.”221 This is another factor that is relevant to both the federal due
process and Montana substantial interactions inquiries. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Walden clearly states that a state’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with due process when
that defendant “purposefully reached out beyond their state and into another
by . . . entering a contractual relationship that envisioned continuing and
wide-reaching contacts in the forum State.”222 Similarly, a nonresident de-
fendant transacts business within Montana under the substantial interactions
test when it has business contracts with more than one Montana business. In
both Grizzly and Nelson, the nonresident defendant had contracts with busi-
nesses in Montana other than the plaintiff.223 These multiple business rela-
216. Cimmaron, 67 P.3d at 260–61; Edsall, 804 P.2d at 1042; Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1380.
217. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
218. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252.
219. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4, advisory comm. nn. (West 2016).
220. Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 730–31.
221. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
222. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479–80) (internal quotations
omitted).
223. Grizzly, 255 P.3d at 148; Nelson, 742 P.2d at 450.
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tionships demonstrated wide-reaching contacts in Montana, thus the nonres-
ident businesses transacted business under Montana’s long-arm statute.224
The Montana Supreme Court’s substantial interactions test not only
extends jurisdiction to the full scope allowed by the Constitution, at some
points it may even tiptoe near the line of potentially violating due process.
In cases like Milky Whey and Spectrum Pool Products, the inquiry seems to
hang on one, very precise factor: which party initiated that business transac-
tion.225 The defendant’s solicitation of business into the forum state is im-
portant because one way a defendant can purposefully avail itself of the
privilege of doing business in a forum state is by initiating contact with a
resident of that state.226 However, the Supreme Court has continually held
that a mere contract is not sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.227
Therefore, it follows that if a nonresident defendant initiated a business
transaction with a Montana resident, the contents of which were to be per-
formed outside of Montana, the contract alone will not satisfy due process,
even though it may be enough to satisfy the definition of transacting busi-
ness.228 Montana can extend its long-arm statute as far as it would like, but
it must remember the due process backdrop and give prong two of the per-
sonal jurisdiction test true consideration each time it finds a nonresident
transacted business in Montana based on substantial interactions within the
state.
E. Implications of The Substantial Interactions Test
In some respects, Towe’s second 1962 prediction, that giving too wide
a definition to transacting business would result in rendering other subsec-
tions of Montana’s long-arm statute meaningless,229 has now come to frui-
tion. The disparate application of Spectrum Pool Products in Milky Whey
serves as an example of this phenomenon. Spectrum Pool Products relied
on both subsection A, “the transaction of any business,” and subsection E,
“entering into a contract for services,” to hold that the nonresident’s actions
fell within Montana’s long-arm statute.230 In Milky Whey, the Court was
only concerned with the application of subsection A and the definition of
transacting business. However, the Milky Whey Court was not able to pull a
clear rule from Spectrum Pool Products because the Court’s consideration
224. Grizzly, 255 P.3d at 149; Nelson, 742 P.2d at 450.
225. Milky Whey, 342 P.3d at 20; Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 731.
226. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
227. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122–23 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478).
228. Compare Prentice Lumber, 474 P.2d at 144, with Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122–23.
229. Towe, supra note 13, at 27–28. R
230. Spectrum Pool Prods., 968 P.2d at 730–31.
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of the two subsections in Spectrum Pool Products was too intertwined.231
Lack of clarity in applying these different sections makes it difficult for the
Court to follow its own precedent and makes it even harder for lower courts
to apply the judicially created definition of transacting business.
On the other hand, subsection A of Montana’s long-arm statute may
have always been intended to reach the full extent of what due process
permits. The Commission Comments do not provide a clear answer,232 but
if the intent was to expand Montana’s definition of transacting business to
the full constitutional limit, the Court has succeeded with its substantial
interactions test. If the original intent was to extend jurisdiction under sub-
section A to the full constitutional limit, then it does not matter that some
parts of the long-arm statute render others meaningless. In that case, each
section simply provides notice to nonresident defendants of types of contact
that may subject them to personal jurisdiction in Montana.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court properly applied precedent in holding
that nonresident defendant Dairy Partners did not transact business pursuant
to Montana’s long-arm statute and therefore was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Montana. The Milky Whey decision aggregated imperative
factors from precedent and named a substantial interactions test for determi-
nation of when a nonresident defendant transacted business in Montana.
Even if the Court had found that Dairy Partners transacted business under
Montana’s long-arm statute, Montana’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
would still fail because it would not comply with due process. The substan-
tial interactions test confers personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants who transact business under subsection A of Montana’s long-arm stat-
ute to the full extent permitted by the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.
231. See supra Part VI, Section A.
232. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4, advisory comm. nn. (West 2016).
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